If private securities class actions alleging fraudulent behavior by officers or directors of a company are meritorious, directors and officers should pay a reputational penalty when they sit on a board of a company where the officers and directors are accused of fraud. I find little evidence of a negative impact associated with allegations of fraud. Using various definitions of board positions as a proxy for the reputation of directors who are accused of fraud, I find that the net number of board positions is consistently increased. Only shareholder class actions in the top quartile of settlements or in which the SEC has initiated a case do directors appear to suffer a reputational penalty when a board they serve on is accused of fraud. The results call into question the merits of private securities class actions.
Introduction
The enforcement of the anti-fraud provisions of United States' securities laws creates "private attorney generals" who enforce public law for private gain (Hensler et al. 2000) . The amount and cost of such litigation is not small. In 2003 163 private securities class actions settled for a total of 3.22 billion dollars (NERA 2004) . The effectiveness of the approach requires that the cases filed by the private attorney are meritorious, i.e. that attorneys do not file cases that have a negative expected value at trial but may induce settlement. This dilemma is particularly evident is security class-action litigation. The primary potential benefit of private shareholder class actions is that they could deter future corporate misconduct by allowing punishing actions that an individual shareholder would not find cost effective to litigate (Hensler et al. 2000) . Such suits have their critics who argue that most of them are frivolous and impose a heavy cost on firms while providing little in the way of deterrence.
In this paper I employ a novel approach of assessing the merits of private securities class actions using the reputational penalty paid by officers and directors who serve on a board accused of fraud in a secondary market.
1 Given the amount of discretion and hidden information implicit in corporate management, directors have a considerable interest in maintaining a reputation for trustworthiness. If private securities class actions are meritorious, we should see directors and officers pay a reputational penalty for sitting on a board of a company where a private securities class action alleges that the some of the officers and directors committed fraud (see Black et al (2004) ). There is some anecdotal evidence that directors implicated in fraudulent dealings are punished in the director labor market. Prior to the October 2001 revelations of fraud the 18 1 There is a long history in economics of using secondary market to examine the impact of public policy. The classic example is Becker's suggestion that if there is discrimination in the housing markets than we should see lower default rates for loans to minorities than for Caucasians. See for example -Berkovec, Canner, Gabriel and Hannan (1998) on lending and Ayres and Waldfogel (2001) for evidence on bail bondsmen.
directors of the Enron Corporation sat on an average of 2.27 other boards as outside directors with a high of 6 and a median of 2. According to theyrule.net, a website tracking corporate boards, by 2004 the average had fallen to .16 with a median of zero. In fact none of the Enron board had added a new directorship and only two retained any of the positions they held in 2000.
This method differs from other evaluations the merits of private securities class-action litigation. Evaluations of the merits of securities class actions have generally followed two approaches. The first compares a sample of firms sued by shareholders for alleged fraud with a matched sample of firms not sued during the sample period. 2 Typically, studies evaluate several measures of corporate governance, such as the number of insiders, to determine if sued firms differ from the control group in ways that might indicate weaker governance (e.g. more insiders on the board, less stock ownership by officers and directors). Alternatively, studies examine the impact of fraud allegations on stock price or the likelihood of exit by officers and directors of the company accused of fraud. 3 Another method is to examine the characteristics of the cases themselves to determine, for example, for what fraction of alleged damages are the cases settled. 4 There are several criticisms of these approaches. The first approach suffers from a classic endogeneity problem. Finding that a fraud allegation decreases the number of insiders on the accused company's board may indicate that the fraud allegation revealed oversight failures by the board. Alternatively, it may be that the number of insiders can be used as evidence against the firm in any trial that may result, and management wishes to inoculate itself partially from charges of governance failures that might be brought at trial. 5 The alternative approaches that examine 2 Several examples of this method are Alexander (1991) , Romano (1991) , Ferris et al. (2002) and Talley and Johnsen (2004) . 3 For example see Romano (1991) 4 See for example Alexander, 1991 , Martin, et al. (1999 5 It is important to notice that management might take this step even if the fraud allegations are unlikely to be proven at trial. settlement rates and amounts are problematic because as Alexander (1991) indicates, firms that are accused of fraud are under considerable pressure to settle claims rather than litigate.
In this study I find that for the average case, there is no evidence of a negative impact on reputation associated with allegations of fraud. In fact, directors accused of fraud increase their net number of board positions for almost all measures of new board positions. For cases in the top quartile of settlement amounts or in those shareholder class actions in which the SEC also initiated a case do directors appear to suffer a reputational penalty measured by a decrease in net board positions. The results call into question the merits of the average private securities class actions. If private class actions were on average meritorious, outside directors who served on the corporate board during the period of alleged fraud should suffer some reputational penalty.
Securities Litigation and Fraud

Are private securities actions meritorious?
Securities cases whether public or private typically arise from alleged intentional violations of disclosure regulations. 6 Federal securities laws have two major fraud enforcement methods.
The first is for the federal government, under the auspices of SEC, to file civil charges or recommend that the Department of Justice file criminal charges in a case. Alternatively or simultaneously, private attorneys can file civil actions, usually on behalf of the class of defrauded shareholders, against the company in question and/or its officers and directors. Usually a private attorney brings these actions on behalf of a group of shareholders and forms the injured shareholders into a class action. Individual shareholders rarely initiate a suit. Typically, a private attorney initiates the cases. 6 The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) administers these requirements under the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, which specifies what information, corporations are required to disclose to investors. This study does not include derivative suits brought on behalf of all shareholders because they are relatively rare and there are too few in the sample period to estimate the impact on reputation. For evidence on derivative suits, see Ferris et al (2002) .
Confidence in the value of private enforcement is widely held. No less than the Supreme Court has argued "...private actions are a most effective weapon in the enforcement of the securities laws." 7 However, Grundfest (1994) argues, "Not so fast. Although praise for private party litigation is well-deserved in many situations, the relationship between private and federal enforcement of securities laws has not been subject to rigorous analysis (page 969)."
The case for the social utility of private litigation ultimately rests on compensating victims and deterring future violations. There is considerable debate as to whether private securities cases are meritorious and therefore able to serve as deterrence to future fraud. Seligman (1994) argues that class actions serve an important enforcement role and ensure appropriate disclosure because the SEC has a limited budget and delegating enforcement authority to private attorneys leaves the SEC free to pursue cases that are not profitable enough for private action.
Detractors claim that suits are usually without merit and exist to extract legal fees from shareholders (Alexander, 1991) . They allege that private parties have incentives to bring cases that the government would never bring even if the SEC budget were unlimited (Grundfest, 1994) .
Private attorneys do not necessarily have the incentive to be scrupulous because directors and other corporate officers have strong incentives, in terms of litigation costs, to settle rather than go to trial (Bohn and Choi, 1996) .
To understand why a private attorney might file a frivolous or non-meritorious case it is necessary to define what constitutes such a suit. The literature has generally labeled a suit frivolous if it has a negative expected value at trial (Alexander, 1991) . That is, a non-meritorious case is one that the plaintiff expects to lose at trial but files the suit with the expectation that the defendant will 7 Grundfest (1994) quoting from J. I. Case v. Borak (1964) . Former SEC commissioner Joseph Grundfest notes " [t] he social value of private enforcement of the federal securities laws has become an article of faith in the federal securities liturgy." settle the case. The obvious question is why a defendant would agree to settle a case in which he would prevail at trial. The usual explanation is to avoid the considerable cost of litigation and in particular the sizable expense of the discovery process (Alexander, 1991 and Bohn and Choi, 1996) . 8 Generally, studies of the determinants of suits find that lawsuits are more likely against larger firms (deeper pockets), firms in certain industries, and firms that experience a large decline in stock value. 9 The conclusions range from almost all suits being frivolous (Alexander, 1991) to a fair number being frivolous (Bohn and Choi, 1996) . Critics of the literature argue that it is far from conclusive (see Seligman, 1994) . The basic criticisms are that the sample sizes have been too small to draw general conclusions (Alexander, 1991) or that the results are difficult to interpret as there is
no benchmark for what constitutes a meritorious case (Bohn and Choi, 1996 and Dunbar et al. 1995) .
There is also a small literature looking at the link between corporate governance and private securities litigation. For example, Beasley (1996) and Dechow, Sloan and Sweney (1996) find that accounting fraud is less likely when there are more outside directors. In an approach similar to one taken in this paper, Niehaus and Roth (1998) and Strahan (1998) find that increased turnover is due to securities class actions. Ferris et al. (2002) find that derivative suits, brought on behalf of all shareholders, are also associated with increased turnover. 10 The difficulty is that turnover and board composition are potentially endogenous. Higher turnover following a fraud allegation could result from a reputational penalty or the additional cost to the director or Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of defending against the allegation. By contrast, the absence of exit may mean that CEO or 8 For example, Perino (2002) cites estimates that discovery constitutes 80% of litigation costs. 9 See for example Alexander (1991) , Grundfest (1994) , Dunbar et al. (1995) , and Bohn and Choi (1996) . 10 Derivative suits are quite rare. Unlike the typical class action suit addressed in this study, they usually specifically address governance issues rather than allegations of fraud.
directors were too secure to be removed even with the allegation and not the absence of a reputational penalty. The approach taken in this paper avoids this issue, as the repuational penalty is estimated using net board positions where the officer or director is not yet potentially entrenched.
The outside director market
According to a number of scholars in finance, shareholder interests drive the market for outside directors. Most prominently, Fama and Jensen (1983) argue that additional board appointments signal director quality. Gilson (1990) and Kaplan and Reishus (1990) suggest that the number of outside directorships is a proxy for reputational capital. Further Klein and Leffler's (1981) assertion that trust is bonded by reputations suggests that outside directors trade in their reputation.
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Directorships are quite lucrative. Yermack (2003) finds that a new outside director's tenure on the board of a Fortune 500 firm is likely to be 10 to 15 years during which he will earn nearly $100,000 dollars in fees and benefits. The rise of stock options means that directors can potentially earn far more from certain boards. Yermack concludes that each new directorship has a present value of almost a million dollars without considering equity incentives.
It is easy to see why a meritorious allegation of fraud might harm the reputation of an officer or director. Directors are hired either by management or shareholders in order oversee management. If a director charged with overseeing a company allows management to defraud shareholders of that company, it indicates that either the director is unable to perform the function 11 The literature has focused on the career impact director's (or more precisely the boards they serve on) willingness to take actions which further the interest of shareholders. Coles and Hoi (2003) focus on the boards' willingness to opt out of anti-takeover legislation on the likelihood of new directorships; Gilson (1988) examines firms in bankruptcy; and Farrell and Whidbee (2000) examine involuntary CEO exits on a director's future board positions. Several studies have focused on firm performance more generally. For example, Ferris et al. (2002) , Brickley et al. (1999) , Booth and Deli (1996) , Brown and Maloney (1996) , and Fich and Shivdasani (2004) interpreting the evidence is that poor corporate performance increases the probability of turnover.
Since a number of critics have alleged stock price fluctuations trigger securities class actions, it is difficult to disentangle the effects of poor corporate performance and fraud allegations without some additional evidence on the reputation penalty incurred by an executive or director accused of fraud.
Data description
Sample Construction
The names of all corporate directors are contained in the firm's proxy statements filed with the SEC. Compact Disclosure maintains an electronic database of all proxy statements. The 12 There is a large literature on the reputational penalty suffered by firms who commit malfeasance. See for example, Jarell and Peltzman (1985) , Mitchel and Maloney (1989), Mithcel (1989) . The related issue is whether securities fraud actually harms shareholders. As Agrawal et al. (1999) point out the most obvious harm to shareholders is that fraud itself decreases firm value or fraud signals lower firm value than anticipated. Bar-Gill and Bebchuk (2003) point out management may wish to misreport earnings either to increase the value of its own holdings in the company (presumably to sell them off to unwitting buyers) or to make new investments prospects look more promising then the actually are. In this case, fraud reveals that firm's profits were lower than management indicated and therefore management's talents are less than anticipated. 16 For example, in 1997 Alan Reynolds, a director on the board of Acme widgets is added to the board of Microcircuits, a company in the sample since 1993. Thus, he enters the sample in 1994 (with Acme) and has no new directorships until 1997 when he has one net directorship. In 2000, he exits the board of Acme and his net directorships equal -1. In 2001, he leaves Microcircuits but joins the board of Advanced Shoes. In 2001, his net directorships are zero. The later example demonstrates an important feature of the reputation measure -leaving a board to join another by construction does not represent a change in a directors' reputation. 17 For other studies utilizing SCAA data, see Carelton et al. (1996) , Bajaj et al. (2000) , and Johnson et al. (2002) . 18 Ferris et al. (2003) utilizes the Stanford database.
The SEC's Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Releases (AAERs) contains data on suits filed by the SEC. Like the SCAA data, the AAER data contain information on cases in which there is an allegation of account fraud. I eliminate cases alleging bribery of foreign officials. The SEC cases cover similar fraud charges to the SCAA sample. I handle the SEC sample in a slightly different manner than the private cases. Almost all SEC allegations receive at least an injunction in which the defendant agrees not to commit fraud again. The case may also result in a disgorgement in which the defendant must return "ill gotten gains," a civil penalty, or criminal penalties. 19 The overlap between public and private cases is nearly complete with almost all public cases having a parallel private class action covering the same fraud allegation.
Several studies have attempted to examine the number of private securities class actions by year. Seligman (1994) has argued that this is inherently misleading as a number of cases are consolidated or dismissed for technical reasons only to be refiled a short time later. For this reason, I construct a fraud allegation indicator equal to one if a private securities class action accuses the officers or directors of a company on which the individual served as a director of fraud during any case in the data that year. I further classify the fraud as public or private and by the outcome of all the cases that alleged fraud during that year. 20 The fraud period for private cases is determined by the class period. The class period is a bracket of time during which an individual must have purchased the stock to be eligible for compensation from the class settlement fund. The SEC's releases publish the dates of the alleged fraud. Since I am looking only at year-to-year changes in the board, the dates of the alleged fraud need only be accurate up to a year.
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I include a director in the relevant fraud category beginning in the year that the fraud allegation becomes public. 22 Although press reports likely predate filings, I take the filings as the year in which the fraud was revealed. Given the rush to file in private cases, this date usually 
Measures of Directorships
A remaining issue is how to best measure reputation using outside directorships because outside directorships vary in value and prestige. Using total net directorships may mask important changes in composition of outside board positions. I utilize a number of different measures of quality of outside directorships. The first set of classifications measures the financial value of the director's portfolio of outside directorships. To control for change in the net value of the director's based on the class period. If more then two cases pursue the same alleged fraud, I take the earliest and latest date. If the cases are eventually consolidated, I take the class period from the consolidated case. 22 It is possible that private parties (attorneys or the press) or the SEC reveal the fraud after the director left the board of the company accused for the fraud. 23 Missing observations or sample differences cause the sample to vary considerably depending on the specification. 
Independent Determinants
The literature on the determinants of outside directorships motivates the control variables.
Previous studies have utilized several measures of corporate performance and estimated the impact of the respective measure on future directorships. The study most closely resembling the data used 24 Because ExecuComp covers only a subset of firms in the dataset, I limit the sample only to directors who at some point serve on a company with data in the ExecuComp sample. The motivation is that other directors provide no information for the regressions.
in this study is Yermack (2002), who utilizes the average equity performance of director's boards.
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I include the average return on equity for the director's companies lagged by one year. Given that directors can serve on multiple boards, I also utilize a slightly different measure. For each director year, I compute both the portion of the director's companies performing in the bottom 25 th percentile of industry-adjusted performance and those in the top quartile of performance for the previous year.
The literature suggests several other determinants of outside directorships. I include a control variable for directors who reach retirement age (over 65). Booth and Deli (1996) suggest that companies are more likely to add CEOs as outside board members so I include an indicator controlling for whether the director is the CEO or Chief Financial Officer (CFO) of a company.
Several studies have suggested that interlock is an important determinant of outside directorships (Booth and Deli, 1996) . I include an indicator variable for insiders equal to one if the director serves on a board in the sample for which he or she is also an officer or director. Yermack (2002) indicates that CEO turnover is often associated with exit by directors that the CEO appointed. As the CompactDisclosure data does not include the appointing CEO, I include an indicator variable for CEO turnover.
The literature also suggests that the current number of board positions is important in determining the number of board positions the director holds in the future. There are three different but not exclusive rationales for including some measure of the stock of current board positions.
The first is that the director's initial reputation is an important determinant of future success in the specifications also include director-fixed effects and year-fixed-effects.
Finally I include a trend variable for the number of years the director has been in the sample. It is certainly the case that directors who have simply been in the market for a longer period of time are more likely to be sued. Ideally I would like to have the total number of years in the director labor market for each director. Since this information is not available I control for the time in the market using director fixed effects plus the number of years the director has been in the market since the first entered the sample. Since their history prior to entering the market is constant the trend measures the incremental impact of one more year in the director labor market on the number of net outside board positions. In an alternative specification I also use only directors who 27 The results below are robust to utilizing any of the different measures of board quality noted above. Fortune 500 firms were utilized for consistency with pervious studies.
are not serving on boards in 1994, the start of the sample, for whom the trend represents the complete experience in the director market Table 1 provides the descriptive statistics of the directors' sample. Table 2 
Sample Characteristics
Impact of fraud allegations on future directorships
Estimation Technique
To explore impact of fraud allegations on director reputation suppose that the number of outside directorships is determined by δ , and year fixed effects, t λ so that the impact of fraud is estimated using the within director and year variation.
All Outside Directorships
The results are presented in column one of Table 3 . A fraud accusation in a private securities case has a statistically significant and positive impact on the reputation of outside directors. A fraud allegation increases the net number of outside directorships by .184. This represents a gain of about 17.5% gain in total board positions per year (increasing from the sample average of 1.066 outside board positions). This is a within-director estimate and is driven not by cross-sectional variation but only by a director's company being accused of fraud.
One explanation for a positive impact of a fraud allegation is that critics of shareholder class actions are correct. The average private securities case is a strike suit designed to elicit settlement but without legal merit; i.e. the average case does not actually identify any fraud. If this were the case, one would expect plaintiff's attorneys to target directors with a high opportunity cost of defending against these cases. Thus, companies with a board made up of directors who are particularly attractive candidates for new outside board positions are also particularly attractive candidates for a suit. An alternative possibility is that the impact of shareholder suits is more direct. Although the cases lack merit, a director who as served on a board defending against such a case is more effective at protecting shareholder interests.
The size of this effect is economically important as well. A one standard deviation in the number of boards that a director serves on with returns in the top quartile of performance decreases the net number of directorships by 18%. The direction of this significant coefficient is surprising as it suggests that an increase in better performing boards reduce reputation. The sign on the number 28 Note that a director may have been accused prior to 1994 but fixed effects capture this. Before returning to a discussion of why a private class action improves a director's reputation, it is possible that changes in the total number of outside directorships is the wrong measure because it masks important changes in the composition of director's portfolio of board positions. It is necessary to consider other measures of outside directorships.
Different Types of Outside Directorships
Column 2 through 8 of Table 3 contains several alternative definitions of directorships. In column 2, I present the results using only directorships that offer a director's pension plan. Again, the impact of private fraud allegations is positive and significant. The impact is similar in directorships that offer directors stock options and, in Column 4, for directorships in the top quartile of director option value. The impact of fraud allegations is also positive and significant for directorships in the top quartile of firm size, measured by either the number of employees or sales.
Only in the case of net directorships in the Fortune 500 is the impact of fraud allegations not significant although it is positive.
Using a number of differing measures, the results indicate that fraud allegations improve the reputation of directors. The magnitude of these effects is similar whether I measure reputation by the compensation value of the net outside directorships, the size of the companies or whether the board position is with a large company.
Robustness Checks
There are two potential issues not addressed in the above results. The first is whether the trend controlling for a directors time in the director's labor market post 1994 adequately controls for role of experience. Table 4 panel A presents the results using only directors to boards after 1994. I am able to identify these directors as new at least to the extent that they were not serving on a board in 1994. For these directors the trend is measuring on additional year of experience starting from zero rather than one additional year starting from the director's experience in 1994.
Because the model includes fixed effects these should be identical. With two exceptions the results are qualitatively identical to the full sample. In the case of net outside directorships with options the coefficient on a fraud allegation is now negative, but not significant and the coefficient on net outside directorships in the Fortune 500 remains positive but is now significant.
A second econometric issue is the use of a dummy variable to capture the impact of a fraud allegation on director reputation. There is an important advantage to using the dummy variable to capture the reputational effect of a fraud allegation. The sample period is only 8 years. While this may appear a long time I am dating the fraud allegation from the filing of the cases. Given that litigation can take several years deciding exactly when to begin any trend is difficult. The method pursued above simply compares directors before and after the allegation.
In Table 4 Panel B I replace the dummy variable with a post fraud allegation (i.e. filing) trend and trend squared. The results from the trend and trend squared are similar to the results using a dummy variable to capture impact of a fraud allegation. In all cases the trend and the trend squared are significant. Figure 1 presents the trend for all net outside board positions. The results
show that the impact of a fraud allegation increases for the first four years after which the impact is mitigated returning to almost zero after 8 years. The results for other classifications of directorships are similar. While the results are consistent with the theory that the average fraud case does not actually identify fraudulent actions by board members it is possible that the positive impact of fraud allegations is that the outside director market rewards not fraud per se but "yes men," individuals who do not monitor management closely.
Governance measures and fraud allegation
To test the possibility that the director labor market rewards lax oversight and not fraud allegations themselves, I examine the impact of fraud allegations on net outside directorships using several common governance measures. Column 1 of Table 5 
Differentiating SEC based fraud allegations
As noted above, one potential difficulty of the test is if management dominates the directorselection process, then although fraud allegations in private security class actions are meritorious, the market for outside directors may not value strong monitors and might actually seek out weak monitors identified by such cases. In the previous section, I use several measures and found no evidence to support such a conclusion because directorships in firms with weaker governance follow the same pattern as the other measures of outside directorships. In this section, I turn to another test: I estimate the impact of an SEC-backed fraud allegation on net directorships.
Specifically, I examine whether fraud allegations against members of the board or management by the SEC harm a director who served on that board's reputation. I estimate the model, respectively. Finally, the impact is a -.069 relative loss in net outside directorships in the Fortune 500. Table 5 Panel B shows the results using the governance measures to define net board positions. In this case, one coefficient is negative and significant and one positive and significant.
Net board positions in the top quartile of board size decrease with an SEC fraud allegation while those that indemnify directors increase.
Extensions
Alternative definitions of fraud allegation
The results thus far have utilized all shareholder class actions as a fraud allegation regardless of the ultimate disposition of the case. This section utilizes several different measures of a fraud allegation. Panel A of Table 7 presents the results using only those fraud cases that settled out of court, the plaintiffs' won at trial, or are still pending in 2002. In the first three cases, the courts have essentially made rulings because all of the fraud allegations are private securities class actions and the courts must approve all settlements between plaintiffs and defendants, which, in effect, sanction the fraud allegation. In this specification, I do not count cases that are withdrawn or dismissed as fraud allegations. The results are substantively identical to the previous section with all different measures of net boards showing a positive and significant increase following a fraud allegation.
The exact method of treating pending cases is debatable. In Panel B of Table 7 , I estimate the model without counting pending cases as fraud allegations. Again the results are substantive and identical to the previous section with one notable exception. With this alternative fraud measure, an allegation causes a net reduction in the number of board positions. One possible explanation is that cases that result in a settlement against a large and high profile company are more meritorious than the average suit.
One major concern about securities class-action cases is that the majority are "strike suits":
lawsuits that are aimed at extracting a settlement from an opportune target but do not address actual fraud. Since strike suits are of lower value than suits that address actual fraud and therefore would win at trial, an alternative method of evaluating the merits of private fraud allegations is to repeat the analysis using only the top quartile of settlement or any case going to trial. The motivation is that such high payout cases and trials reflect a creditable allegation of fraud while low value cases are ones that accept smaller amounts.
In Table 8 repeats the above estimation and shows the results of estimating the model using the narrow definition of a private fraud allegation defined above. In addition, I utilize a narrower definition of all SEC allegations by classifying SEC fraud allegations as only those cases in which the SEC did not settle the case with only an injunction. The results are stronger than above with the majority being negative and significant. All net outside directorships decline when the director has served on the board of a company accused by the SEC of fraud and that allegation ended in a conviction, fine or disgorgement. 29 The law relaxed the joint and several liability standard in effect prior to 1995 implemented a system of proportional liability based on proximity to the fraud with less culpable defendants paying a smaller proportion of the damages. The major objective of the provision was to reduce the hunt for "deep pockets," that is filing a case against a defendant with little connection to a fraud in order to increase the overall ability of defendants to pay any settlement or award. The law also limited discovery while motions to dismiss were pending. In addition, the law provided a "safe harbor" against lawsuits if statements to investors included certain risk disclosures. The act also included provisions for punishing plaintiffs' attorneys who file legally frivolous lawsuits and/or suits that
Alternative definitions and SEC suits
Differential Impact of Fraud Allegations by Position
Not all directors or officers are equally well positioned to know the true state of a corporation's finances. It is possible that the reputation effect of a fraud allegation differs depending on the information available to the director when he or she served on a the above specifications. In addition, I also decompose the results using each individual classification and creating an indicator variable equal to one if the director held any of the three positions on a board accused of fraud. I present the results in Table 9 . Finally, because these three classifications are rare, I present the results using only overall directorships. The respective cell sizes are simply too small to provide meaningful estimates for the various classifications of outside directorships.
In each case the impact of having additional information is positive, although in the case of audit committee membership the effect is not significant. Both CEO and CFO experience a relative increase in the number of net outside board positions beyond that experienced by any director serving on the board of a company accused of fraud. The evidence suggests that directors who we would suspect of having inside information about any fraud perpetrated by the company do not suffer a reputational penalty. In the case of CEO and CFO, they appear to actually do better than other CEO or CFOs in their net outside board positions and better than other outside directors serving on a board accused of fraud.
Conclusions
Before turning to an interpretation of the results, it is useful to review the key findings of the paper. The effect of serving on a board of company charged with fraud in a private securities class action increases the net number of outside directorships for member of that board. The result is robust to several different specifications of outside directorships and several different definitions of which class actions constitute an allegation of fraud. This is consistent with the average case being a strike suit: one that does not identify actual fraud. Because the average private securities class action is a strike suit, it does not convey negative information about the director.
There are two explanations for why the effect on director reputation is positive. One explanation is that a strike suit is more likely to elicit settlement for a director who is more effective and desirable as an outside director because he has a higher opportunity cost of time. Given this targeting method of filing suits, the coefficient on fraud allegations is positive. An alternative explanation for the positive coefficient is that directors who serve on the board of a company accused of fraud actually develop useful human capital that is beneficial to other companies and therefore they are in greater demand.
The positive coefficient is also consistent with the hypothesis that the director labor market actually rewards lax oversight and not being the target of a suit per se. The other results of the paper argue against such an interpretation. The impact is no different when I estimate the repuational impact of a fraud allegation using net outside board positions on companies classified by lax oversight characteristics. When I define a fraud allegation only as cases in the top quartile of settlements or that go to trial, the impact of a fraud allegation is negative and significant across different measures of outside directorships. Moreover, when the SEC files a case the impact is negative and significant. Directors who serve on more than one board accused of fraud also seem to improve their reputation at least for reputation measures based on company size or outside directorships in the Fortune 500. Following the passage of the PSLRA -a 1995 law designed to reduce the ability of plaintiffs' attorneys to file strike suits -the impact on the reputation of directors is reduced, although it is still positive. This is consistent with the law's intended purpose of reducing strike suits. Finally, directors who are the CEO or CFO of a company accused of fraud actually increase their net outside directorships beyond the increase experienced by all directors on fraud-accused boards. This suggests that even directors directly in a position to observe the fraud if it occurred, or who at least had been charged with preventing it, are rewarded in the director labor market. The evidence is consistent with the hypothesis that the average private securities case does not provide evidence of director malfeasance or a failure of oversight. While the evidence is consistent with a number of suits not being meritorious it also suggests that some suits, those with large settlements, do identify officer or director malfeasance. The policy implication of the results is ambiguous. The results suggest that cases of limited social value are ending up in the courts. At the same time meritorious cases clearly exist. Whether the social benefit of the meritorious cases is larger than the cost of the non-meritorious cases is impossible to say. The results do suggest that PSLRA, which aimed to increase the hurdle necessary to bring a securities case, was at least moving in the right direction. Exactly how restrictive the law should be is, as they say, worth further study but beyond the scope of this paper.
Yermack, David (2003) "Remuneration, Retention, and Reputation Incentives for Outside Directors," Working paper. Fixed effect estimates of the change in the net number of outside directorships. I construct the change in the number of net directorships by subtracting the number of boards the director exits from in year t from the number of boards that add the director in year t. Observations are for a director year for all directors holding at least one outside directorship between 1994 and 2002. Model (1) includes only directorships in the top quartile of block ownership. Model (2) includes only outside directorships in the top quartile of insider proportion on the board. Model (3) includes only directorships in the top quartile of board size. Model (4) includes only outside directorships on the boards of companies that indemnify their directors against shareholder suits. Model (5) includes only directorships in the top quartile of CEO tenure. All models include director, industry and year fixed effects.
(1) Fixed effect estimates of the change in the net number of outside directorships. In Panel A, a fraud allegation does not include any case that a judge eventually dismissed or was drop by the plaintiffs unilaterally. Panel B uses the same definition of fraud as Panel A but also excludes cases that are pending when I created the sample. Panel C classifies only those cases that go to trial or have a settlement in the top quartile of settlements as fraud allegations. Panel D interacts the encompassing definition of fraud allegations with a dummy variable equal to one if the case was filed during or after 1995. The public fraud allegations are constructed using SEC cases that involve a fine, disgorgement, civil penalty and/or a criminal conviction. All models include director and year fixed effects.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (0.082) Director has been an audit committee member, CEO or CFO for a company named in a class action lawsuit 0.112*** ( 0 . 0 2 6 ) Standard errors in parentheses * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
